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SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
FEDERAL
COLLATERAL
ATTACK OF
STATE CONVICTIONS
SHARPLY
CURTAILED

By Charles Jay Iseman

The Supreme Court of the United
States, in the two recent companion
cases of Stone v. Powell and Wolff v.
Rice, 96S.Ct. 3037 (1976), sharply curtailed access to federal courts by persons
convicted of crimes in state courts. The
Court held that " ... where the State has
provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim,
a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground
that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced
at his trial." [d. at 3052. Prior to this decision, if a defendant convicted in state
court had objected unsuccessfully to the
admission of evidence allegedly obtained pursuant to an illegal search and
seizure, and had subsequently
exhausted all his appeals, he still had the
right to "collaterally attack" his conviction by bringing a habeas corpus action
in federal district courts.
FACTS
Powell became involved in a California liquor store altercation which resulted in the death of the store manager's wife. Ten hours later Powell was
arrested for vagrancy in Nevada. In a
search incident to the vagrancy arrest,
the Nevada police discovered a .38
caliber revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder. Powell was extradited to California where he was convicted in state court of second degree
murder. He sought unsuccessfully to

exclude under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US.
643 (1961), the revolver and the testimony of the Nevada police officer, on
the grounds that the Nevada vagrancy
statute was unconstitutionally vague and
that consequently his arrest and the ensuing search and seizure were unlawful.
Powell's second degree murder conviction was affirmed by a California District
Court of Appeals, which held that the
admission of the police officer's testimony was, at most, harmless error. The
Supreme Court of California denied
Powell's petition for habeas corpus relief. A United States District Court denied Powell's amended petition for a writ
of federal habeas corpus. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed, finding that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague, rendering Powell's arrest illegal.
In Wolff v. Rice, supra, Rice was convicted of murder in a Nevada state court.
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed
the conviction, finding that the incriminating evidence was properly admitted, having been seized pursuant to a
search conducted under a valid search
warrant. A United States District Court
granted Rice's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus on the ground that the
search warrant was invalid because the
supporting affidavit did not meet the
Aguilar-Spinelli test. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 US. 410 (1969); Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 US. 108 (1964). The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed. Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93
(1974).
THE COURT'S OPINION
The Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari, Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct. 29
(1975), for the purpose of addressing the
issues of the proper scope of federal
habeas corpus and the exclusionary
rule. The Court examined the historical
development of both the writ of habeas
corpus in the United States and the creation and expansion of the exclusionary
rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment's
ban on unreasonable searches and sei-

zures. The Court found that the
exclusionary rule has been stringently
applied in federal criminal cases. This
application flows from the Supreme
Court's administrative role as supervisor
over the federal courts and from its attempt to maintain order and integrity
within the federal judiciary by setting the
highest possible standards. The Court
further found that the reason for the
Mapp extension of the exclusionary rule
to the states was the belief that exclusion
of illegally seized evidence would deter
future illegal police conduct. However,
the Court noted that the evidence
excluded by the rule tends to have great
probative value in establishing guilt or
innocence.
Consequently, the rule results in
evidentiary windfalls to criminals rather
than protection for the pUblic. The Court
stated:
Application of the rule thus deflects
the truth finding process and often
frees the guilty. The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police officer and the
windfall afforded a guilty defendant
by application of the rule is contrary to
the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice. Thus,
although the rule is thought to deter
unlawful police activity in part for the
nurturing of respect for the Fourth
Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for
the law and the administration of justice. These long-recognized costs of
the rule persist when a criminal con-.
viction is sought to be overturned on
collateral review on the ground that a
search-and-seizure claim was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of
state courts. 96 S. Ct. at 3050.
In concluding, the Court balanced the
rights of the accused with the public
interests in both safety and the efficient
administration of justice. As a result of
this decision, once a defendant convicted in state court has exhausted all of
his state appellate review, with each step
proViding the right to be heard, he may
not collaterally attack the admission of allegedly illegally seized evidence through
the federal habeas corpus procedure.

